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NOTES
Applying the Law of
Proportionality to Cyber Conflict:
Suggestions for Practitioners
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the applicability of the law of armed conflict,
and particularly the concept of proportionality, to cyber attacks.
After exploring deviations in terminology that may lead to
confusion in the field, it considers the difficulties associated with
applying an area of law first implemented in the post-World War
II era to technologies that have only become vitally important in
recent years. Delving into some of the facets of cyber technology
that make it unique as a potential battleground, this Note
examines why those qualities make the law of proportionality
particularly difficult to apply. Acknowledging that the law of
armed conflict, although perhaps inapt, is nonetheless
compulsory, this Note ends with several suggestions that may
assist military commanders in conducting cyber operations in a
way that comports with the law as it exists today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, the Baltic nation of Estonia was well on the way to
earning its recently acquired nickname, "eStonia": the country had
used computer networks to automate and integrate nearly every aspect
of its governance and society. 1 Estonian citizens banked, voted in
parliamentary elections, and even paid for parking using
interconnected computer systems.2 The internet phone company Skype
headquartered there. 3 The nation was a veritable utopia of the
burgeoning internet culture and a "window into the future."4
All of that changed on April 27, 2007, when the nation suffered
what was then the most widespread cyber attack in history, and
possibly the first instance of international cyber war.5 In only a few
hours, the nation's media websites, banking sites, and government
computers all suffered black outs.6 Attackers targeted all of Estonia's
major commercial banks, telecoms, media outlets, and some essential
servers. 7 Using Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDos) attacks, the
assaults lasted twenty-two days and effectively crippled the nation's
electronic infrastructure.8 By flooding the Estonian computer systems
with an enormous number of requests, the attackers were able to
effectively overload the systems and thereby deny service to legitimate
users.9 Nearly every Estonian citizen felt the impact, and the populace
1. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber
Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 192, 193-94 (2009) ("By 2007,
Estonia had instituted an e-government in which ninety percent of all bank services, and
even parliamentary elections, were carried out via the Internet.").
2. See id.
3. Id. at 194.
4. Id.
5. See id. ("Never before had an entire country been targeted on almost every
digital front all at once.").
6. See id. at n.10 ("All major commercial banks, telecoms, media outlets, and
name servers--the phone books of the Internet--felt the impact, and this affected the
majority of the Estonian population.").
7. Id.
8. See Ira E. Hoffman, International Cooperation in Combating Cyberthreats
and U.S. Law, 47 MD. B. J. 36, 38 (2014) ("[I]n April 2007, the first series of sustained
Distributed Denial-of-Service cyberattacks, lasting 22 days, were launched.").
9. See id. ("The attacks... flooded computer, servers, routers and websites
supporting government ministries, political parties, banks, internet service providers
("ISPs") and telecommunications companies, and blocked legitimate users.").
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reacted with hostility 10 Rioting and social upheaval followed. The
unrest resulted in one death and injuries to 150 people."
Some believe the Russian government was responsible for the
attack, although Estonia's neighbor to the east has never accepted
responsibility for the events, and the allegations have not been
proven.12 Given the state of political tension that existed between the
two nations preceding the attacks-Russian officials bristled at the
Estonian government's displacement of a Soviet-era war statue, among
other perceived transgressions-and considering the difficulty in
identifying individuals over computer networks, this theory remains a
possibility. 13 Others have firmly held that no link to the Russian
government exists and that "numerous, albeit unaffiliated, hackers"
perpetrated the attacks.14
It was the first major cyber attack aimed against a state, and
possibly the first instance of international cyber war, if Russia was in
fact to blame. The attack alerted the world to what kinds of damage
and destruction would be possible without an enemy force ever setting
foot on a rival nation's soil.15 Perhaps most surprisingly to those in
elements of the international security community, Estonia's attackers
affected all of this chaos solely through computer networks. 16 The
attack caused reverberations throughout the international community
and provided the impetus for numerous changes in policy and practice
for many international entities. 17 The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), for instance, established a Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence and headquartered it in Tallinn, the
capitol of Estonia.'8
10. See Shackelford, supra note 1, at 194 ("In a matter of days the cyber attacks
brought down most critical websites, causing widespread social unrest and rioting, which
left 150 people injured and one Russian national dead.").
11. Id.
12. See id. ("At the time, Russia was suspected of the attacks.").
13. See id. at 205 ("The removal of the monument infuriated even Russians
outside Estonia.").
14. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 38.
15. See Shackelford, supra note 1, at 194 ("Regardless of who was actually to
blame, this was the first large-scale incident of a cyber assault on a state. It was but a
taste of what information warfare ("IW") can do to a modern information society.")
(citation omitted).
16. See id. at 193 ("A computer network was responsible for everything.").
17. See Hoffman, supra note 8, at 38 ("Still, the realization that cyberattacks
could threaten the national security of an entire country was a 'true wake-up call for
NATO,' including its leading member, the United States.").
18. Antonia Chayes, Rethinking Warfare: The Ambiguity of Cyber Attacks, 6
HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 474, 511 (2015).
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The Estonia example shows the potential power of cyber warfare
operations.1 9 In an incredibly short amount of time, a hostile force with
relatively little technological capability or funding can cripple a
nation's infrastructure, impede the effective use of civilian and military
systems, and completely alter the state of affairs on an international
level.20 If the world did not know it before, one fact became strikingly
clear after the Estonia attacks: cyber attacks can be powerful tools.2 1
This does not mean, however, that cyber operations need always
be used to perpetrate chaos. Although the Estonia example shows what
deleterious events can unfold when malicious actors implement cyber
attacks against a civilian population, cyber operations can provide an
equally powerful and legitimate tool when used by nations with
righteous motivations. Many nations have begun to develop these tools
as parts of their military repertoire. 22 The American military, for
example, has started to build a robust program of offensive and
defensive cyber capabilities.23 Those who would see themselves as "the
good guys," however, can only be good if they operate within the
boundaries of the law. Nations must operate within the requirements
the international community has agreed upon to denote the limits of
acceptable practice: the law of armed conflict. This Note attempts to
provide some insight into the difficulties of applying the law of armed
conflict to cyber warfare, and to provide some suggestions to military
commanders who wish to engage in cyber operations within the bounds
of lawful combat.
Much of the law of cyber warfare today is governed by the
application of laws-largely by analogy-that were written before the
advent of modern computing technology. 24 The absence of laws
19. See Shackelford, supra note 1, at 195 ("As with nuclear radiation, cyberwar
can destroy a modern state without drawing blood.").
20. Id. at 194.
21. See id. ("Indeed, the attacks were so widespread and the results so grave that
Aaviksoo considered invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO"), which states that an assault on one allied country obligates the alliance to
attack the aggressor.").
22. See Tod Leavena & Christopher Dodge, The United States Cyber Command:
International Restrictions vs. Manifest Destiny, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 1, 1-2
(2012) ("United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates commissioned the United
States Cyber Command ("USCYBERCOM") on June 23, 2009, in order 'to coordinate
Pentagon efforts in the emerging battlefield of cyberspace and computer-network
security."').
23. Jim Garamone, Cybercom Chief Discusses Importance of Cyber Operations,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, (April 14, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-
View/Article/604453 [https://perma.cc/QPP4-ZJXU] (archived Dec. 18, 2016) ("Cyber is
an operational domain, and military leaders are going to have to understand its
importance and the opportunities and challenges of operating in the domain, Navy Adm.
Michael S. Rogers said.").
24. See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE 5 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) ("There are no treaty provisions that deal
directly with 'cyber warfare.' Similarly, because State cyber practice and publicly
available expressions of opinio juris are sparse, it is sometimes difficult to definitively
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specifically written or designed to deal with the nuances of cyber
warfare, combined with the prevalent application of other fields that
are only tangentially related, leads to a host of issues for practitioners
in the realm of cyber warfare.25 The difficulty in applying laws that
were written before the concept of cyber warfare existed is that it may
hinder military practitioners who engage, or seek to engage, enemy
forces through the use of cyber attacks.26
In Part II, this Note provides a background on both cyber warfare
as it is conceived today and on the law of proportionality. It discusses
first the definition of the term "cyber attack" as it has been suggested
by multiple sources, and the differences in those suggestions, along
with the difficulties in reconciling them. It then reviews the idea of
"proportionality" and its importance in the law of armed conflict.
In Part III, this Note analyzes the application of the
proportionality rule to cyber attacks and the difficulties associated
with this application. These include difficulties arising from the
prevalence of dual-use systems (both because of the increased impact
on civilian infrastructure and because of the complications in
discerning what is military from what is civilian) and the difficulties
presented by the requirement to predict knock-on effects.
In Part IV, this Note offers three suggestions that may assist a
military commander who is considering using a cyber attack as a form
of military engagement, so that the commander may be in compliance
with current international law. First, a thorough analysis should be
conducted prior to the attack. Second, a specialist in the realm of
computer technology should be retained and consulted for the purposes
of advisement. Finally, the cyber attack may be conducted in a way
that is not an "attack," and thus not be susceptible to the law of armed
conflict.
II. BACKGROUND: CYBER ATTACKS AND PROPORTIONALITY
The international legal community first began to take note of
cyber operations in the late 1990s.27 After the United States Naval
conclude that any cyber-security customary international law norm exists.") [hereinafter
TALLIN MANUAL].
25. See Chayes, supra note 18, at 510 ("However, until international agreements
alter the law, or the International Court of Justice rules on such issues, many of the
novel legal questions that cyber attacks pose will be answered by creative, if contrived,
adaptation of historic doctrines.").
26. See id. at 506 ("Since ambiguity is likely to continue, definitive allocation of
governmental responsibility among civilian and military agencies will remain a question
in many situations.").
27. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 1.
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
War College held the first major legal conference on the subject in
1999, the world began to see the breadth of cyber operations' impact in
the Estonia attack in 2007,28 attacks against Georgia during its war
with Russia in 2008, and the Stuxnet worm in 2010,29 among other
smaller events.30
The law of international armed conflict, much older than the cyber
operations that it arguably governs, has its roots in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions. 31
Specifically, the concept of proportionality dates back to Additional
Protocol I, signed in 1977.32 Although the definitions of both "cyber
attack" and "proportionality," may vary in a given context, some
discussion of each, as it stands on its own, may be useful before an
exploration of their interaction and compatibility, or lack thereof.
A. Defining Cyber Attack
The terminology that surrounds cyber warfare remains in a
nascent state partly because cyber warfare is a relatively new field.33
Legal experts, institutions, and military practitioners have offered a
number of definitions of various terms to describe technologies that are
often in flux. This undeveloped terminology includes one definition
central to the practice: what is a cyber attack?
There are several reasons why arriving at a concise terminology
should be of importance to the international legal community. First,
the legal regime should keep pace with the technological realm it seeks
to govern. 34 While there is a possibility that "cyber practice may
quickly outdistance agreed understandings as to its governing legal
regime," an established set of terms and definitions may allow the law
to remain applicable.35 Further, those individuals in the field who
conduct, or seek to conduct cyber operations rely on legal definitions to
ensure that their actions remain within the bounds of the law and
within accepted international norms.36 Without a working definition of
28. See supra Part I.
29. See infra subsection III.B.2.
30. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 1-2.
31. Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct., 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
32. Id.
33. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
817, 823 (2012) ("Existing definitions of 'cyber-attack' and related terms vary widely.").
34. See id. ("The absence of a shared definition has made it difficult for analysts
from different countries to develop coordinated policy recommendations and for
governments to engage in coordinated action.").
35. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 3.
36. See Hathaway et al., supra note 33, at 832 ("[A] distinction is crucial to
domestic and international efforts to implement cyber-security, because it more
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cyber attack, a commander is unable to know what a cyber attack is,
whether his actions constitute a cyber attack, and most importantly,
whether his actions are legal.
Two definitions of cyber attack seem to be more fully accepted
than others. In 2011, the United States Cyber Command issued the
first official military definition: "a hostile act using computer or related
networks or systems, and intended to disrupt and/or destroy an
adversary's critical cyber systems, assets, or functions."37 Then, in
2013, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare (the Tallinn Manual), perhaps the definitive
contemplation of the international law as it applies to cyber warfare,
offered a compelling alternative, defining a cyber attack thusly: "[a]
cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that
is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage
or destruction to objects."38 Both definitions offer succinct phrasing
that attempts to capture broad swaths of substance, but their
meanings may not be immediately clear. Because ach noun, verb, and
adverb carries operative weight, these sentences that may initially
seem straightforward are in fact packed with significance. The breadth
of these definitions has consequently caused disagreement.
It is important to note that the term "cyber attack" is not limited
to those events that may come most quickly to the minds of laypersons.
Many Americans, if they were to hear the term "cyber attack," might
think first of something like the theft of personal information by back-
alley agents, or of the Sony Pictures film studio "hack" as archetypal
examples.3 9 Although those events may fall within the meaning of the
term (they may not, depending on the definition being used), cyber
attacks are not limited to small-scale activity, nor are they exclusively
the province of "hackers" or rogue criminal agents.40 Instead, they have
thus far quite often been seen to be the actions of established nations
engaging in a new kind of warfare on a new type of battlefield.
effectively tailors the legal approach to the threat posed and focuses resources on true
national security threats.").
37. Memorandum from Gen. James E. Cartwright on Joint Terminology for
Cyberspace Operations 5 (Nov. 2011), http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/
2010-11-joint%2OTerminology%20for%20Cyberspace%200perations
.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZG3-W263] (archived Jan. 6, 2017). See also Hathaway et al.,
supra note 33, at 832-37 (discussing additional definitions).
38. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 106.
39. See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures hack, explained, WASH. POST (Dec.
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switchlwp/2014/12/18/the-sony-
pictures-hack-explained/ [https://perma.cc/3H3S-V3NM] (archived Dec. 18, 2016)
(describing the Sony hack).
40. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 106-10 (defining "cyber attack").
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Many commenters and authorities have conceptualized a cyber
attack as closely analogous to a military attack.4 1 A cyber attack could
be one that is conducted by a small state against a larger state, or by a
larger state against a smaller one, or it could be an event perpetrated
in the context of non-international armed conflict.42 Further, a cyber
attack is not necessarily criminal in nature.43 The use of a cyber attack
can be a legitimate tool employed by militaries of established nations
within the rules of armed conflict, if they are conducted in the proper
fashion.44 Just as a firearm or a fighter jet is not inherently criminal,
a cyber attack does not carry with it a moral connotation. The rightness
or wrongness of a cyber attack depends on a complex network of legal
and moral questions that must be addressed and are subject to a great
deal of interpretation. Whether a cyber attack is normatively "good" or
"bad" depends much less on the nature of the cyber attack itself, and
much more on the identity of the actor behind the attack, the
motivations that propel his actions, and whether the actor has abided
by international norms in conducting the attack. In fact, cyber attacks
may present a desirable alternative to more violent actions that would
alternately be available to military commanders.45
Still, disagreement over the definition of a cyber attack persists.46
Although the Tallinn Manual and the U.S. Government have offered
definitions of the term that seek to be definitive, there remains
disagreement about the wording that should be used in order to
capture the most important aspects of a cyber attack, without
employing a definition that is overly broad. 47 As with any definition,
the language chosen creates a category that may be either under- or
over-inclusive. To the extent that policy decisions depend on this
categorization, the agreement on a definition carries importance.48
41. See, e.g., Hathaway et al. supra note 33, at 823-32 (describing cyber attacks
as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the
purposes of causing damage or disruption").
42. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 106-10 (defining "cyber attack").
43. See id. at 3 ("One of the challenges States face in the cyber environment is
that the scope and manner of international law's applicability to cyber operations .. . has
remained unsettled since their advent.").
44. Id.
45. See Major Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use
Under International Law, 64 A. F. L. REV. 121, 158 ("This example demonstrates the
non-physical destruction aspect of cyber warfare operations, which in many cases will
reduce the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian property.")
46. For example, Hathaway et al. describe competing definitions of cyber
attacks. See Hathaway et al., supra note 33, at 823. In the first, cyber attacks are defined
as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the
purposes of causing damage or disruption." Id. The second defines the same term as a
"deliberate attempt to disable or destroy another country's computer networks." Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. ("The absence of a shared definition has made it difficult for analysts
from different countries to develop coordinated policy recommendations and for
governments to engage in coordinated action.").
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Some commenters have suggested varyingly broad and narrow
definitions, with treatments fluctuating depending on the political
motives behind the attack, who carries out the attack, and what the
attack intends to accomplish. 49 Definitions diverge in their
assessments of the political motives behind the attack, and depend on
the subjective intent of the actor behind the attack. 50 While some
commenters endorse a definition of cyber attacks that encompasses
any attempt to disturb a nation's computer infrastructure, others
would narrow the definition to exclude cyber crime. 1 In other words,
if the purpose of the attack is mere theft or lawlessness, it would not
rise to the level of a cyber attack.52 These commenters would instead
reserve the term cyber attack for those attacks that are politically
motivated.5 3
Another distinction, based on who carries out the attack, is
perhaps the most controversial.54 Some definitions of a cyber attack
would encompass only those attacks instigated by nation states or their
direct agents.5 5 While this definition, likely grounded in conventional
definitions of war that envisioned two nations under distinct banners
engaging in symmetric, open warfare, attempts to paint a bright-line
rule in defining cyber attacks, it omits the crucial possibility that non-
state actors would perpetrate a cyber attack.56 In the contemporary
environment, where the tools necessary to conduct a cyber event are
prevalent and readily available to both states and non-state actors,
other commenters see a real possibility that non-state actors may be
common players in the realm of cyber warfare, and those commenters
would broaden the definition to include those attacks perpetrated by
non-state actors.57
A third distinction would depend on the effects of the action
taken.58 Some commenters reduce the definition of a cyber attack to
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. ('These definitions, however, do not distinguish between a cyber-
crime, cyber-attack, and cyber-war.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 824 ("[One definition] limits the definition to attacks perpetrated
by nation-states, thereby excluding entirely plausible scenarios in which attacks are
carried out by non-state actors.").
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 831 ("[C]yber-attacks are a particularly attractive weapon for
terrorists and other non-state actors.").
58. See id. at 828 ('The objective of a cyber-attack must be to undermine the
function of a computer network.").
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those actions which "undermine the function" of a computer system.59
This would include attacks that attempt to disrupt the operating
system of a computer or attempt to limit the usefulness of the system
by impacting the accuracy of the information the operating system
interprets.60 This definition, however, would leave out many actions
that others include in defining a cyber attack, such as cyber espionage
or cyber exploitation.61 Attacks that aim to gain access to secure files,
to divulge secret information, or to monitor actions on a computer
would not be considered cyber attacks under this definition.62 Only
those actions that clearly aim to disrupt the functioning of a computer
system would qualify as cyber attacks.63
A definition that does not include the theft of secure information
is probably narrower than what is generally accepted in the community
today.64 The U.S. Cyber Command definition includes an attack that
"intend(s) to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary's . . . assets." The
Tallinn Manual definition includes an attack that is "reasonably
expected to cause . . . damage or destruction to objects." 65 Both
definitions could reasonably be interpreted to include acts of cyber
espionage.66 Considering the broad range of uses and employments of
computer systems in today's society, if the definition is limited in such
a way as to exclude these kinds of actions, the cyber attack terminology
could lose much of its meaning and viability.6 7
These competing definitions lead to a lack of clarity in the field
and increased confusion for practitioners. Further, varying definitions
create difficulty in assessing whether a proposed cyber action
constitutes an "attack," and whether it is subject to the law of armed
conflict.68 If military practitioners are unsure whether their actions
constitute a cyber attack, they may not know whether their actions are
subject to the law of armed conflict.69
59. Id. at 826 (recommending the following definition: "A cyber-attack consists
of any action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or
national security purpose").
60. Id.
61. See id. at 829 ("By contrast, neither cyber-espionage nor cyber-exploitation
constitutes a cyber-attack because these concepts do not involve altering computer
networks in a way that affects their current or future ability to function.").
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 24-26.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Hathaway et al., supra note 33, at 830 ("Although all of these incidents
of cyber-espionage compromised the security of a computer network for the purpose of
carrying out a military objective, they did not 'undermine the function' of a computer
system and thus were not cyber-attacks as defined here.") (internal citation omitted).
68. See id. at 822 ("Activities in cyberspace defy many of the traditional
categories and principles that govern armed conflict under the law of war.").
69. Id.
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B. Defining Proportionality
Proportionality is one of the four broadly recognized principles
that govern the use of force under the law of armed conflict.7 0 Along
with necessity, distinction, and unnecessary suffering, the rule of
proportionality provides a foundational tenet of lawful armed conflict
by which military practitioners must abide if they wish to conduct
themselves in a permissible manner. 71 Unlike the terminology
surrounding cyber warfare and the nebulous nature of the definition of
cyber attack, the definition of proportionality is relatively
straightforward and well agreed upon.72
The rule of proportionality has its roots in Article 51(5)(b) of the
Geneva Conventions' Additional Protocol 1 which states that any act is
indiscriminate which "may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."73 The concept has
been summed up thusly: "[t]he costs of the use of lethal force must be
outweighed by the value of what the lethal force is meant to
accomplish, the military objectives of the use of force." 74 In other
words, it is unlawful for a military commander to resort to the use of
lethal force unless the foreseeable collateral damage is proportional to
the military advantage to be gained.
While it is a well-accepted rule of international law that military
actions may not target or intentionally cause destruction or damage to
civilians or civilian objects, the fact that civilian assets are incidentally
harmed during a military attack does not automatically make the
attack illegal.7 5 Such incidental damage is commonly referred to as
"collateral damage." 76 Although collateral damage is usually
70. See Matthew L. Beran, The Proportionality Balancing Test Revisited: How
Counterinsurgency Changes "Military Advantage,"ARMY LAW, Aug. 2010, at *1 n.2 ('The
four universally-recognized principles governing the use of force in the law of armed
conflict are military necessity, distinction (also known as discrimination),
proportionality, and unnecessary suffering.").
71. See id. ("The principle of proportionality requires the commander to conduct
a balancing test to determine if the incidental injury, including deaths to civilians and
damage to civilian objects, is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage expected to be gained.").
72. See MICHAEL NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 15 (2014) ("Ours is the 'era of proportionality' in the sense that one encounters
proportionality as an integral aspect of legal and moral discourse in virtually every legal
system.").
73. Protocol I, supra note 31.
74. See NEWTON & MAY, supra note 72, at 3.
75. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 159.
76. See id. at 159 ("Incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to or
destruction of civilian objects, is often termed 'collateral damage."').
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undesirable from a normative standpoint, the fact that an attack
results in civilian casualties, or the destruction of civilian property
does not make the attack illegal per se, it only invokes the rule of
proportionality.7 7 This rule states that the legality of an attack instead
depends on the "relationship between the harm an attacker reasonably
expects to incidentally cause to civilians and civilian objects and the
military advantage that he or she anticipates as a result of the
attack."7 8
An example may offer some clarity. In early 2009, while members
of the Afghan military conducted a nine-hour firefight against
insurgent forces in Farah, Afghanistan, ground units called the U.S.
Air Force and Navy to provide assistance in the form of airstrikes.7 9
The second of multiple airstrikes targeted a building occupied by the
insurgent forces, dropping two 500-pound bombs and two 2000-pound
bombs from U.S. aircrafts.80 Although neither the ground commander
nor the aircrew could confirm the absence or presence of civilians in
the buildings, the ground commander ordered the strike. 8 The
airstrikes allegedly resulted in 147 deaths, many of them civilian. 82 It
was the deadliest case of civilian casualties since the opening of the
American occupation in 2001.83
A later investigation conducted by U.S. Central Command found
that the law of proportionality had been violated. 84 Because the
commander who ordered the airstrikes had no knowledge as to whether
or not civilians were present inside the buildings, he was unable to
conduct the necessary weighing of military advantage against the
possibility of civilian loss of life and damage to property.85 This was an
unfortunate and avoidable event illustrative of the necessity and
prudence of a proportionality test that should precede a military
attack.
Proportionality can be a complex and potentially confusing
concept to apply even in the most plainly conventional of scenarios.8 6
In a contemporary conflict, however, the confusion is multiplied by the
presence of insurgents, guerilla tactics, and non-state actors, all of
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Beran, supra note 70, at *5.
80. Id.
81. Id. *
82. Carlotta Gall & Taimoor Shah, Villagers in Afghanistan Describe Chaos of
U.S. Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/
pop/articles/15farah.html [https://perma.cc/L7HU-AKYZ] (archived Dec. 19, 2016).
83. Id.
84. Beran, supra note 70, at *5-6.
85. Id. at *6.
86. See id. at *4 ("[N]o further guidance, in the form of definitions or examples,
is provided to commanders, who are left with only the plain meaning of the words.").
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which add variables and unknowable aspects to the equation. 87
Further, the application of an already unwieldy principle such as
proportionality to an increasingly cloudy field such as cyber warfare
may lead to even more uncertainty.
It is also important to note that the principle of proportionality
bars attacks based only on civilian casualties; it does not aim to provide
a "fair fight" between combatants.8 8 The proportionality rule limits the
lawfulness of an attack if the attack would have an unduly impact on
a civilian population, and the rule does not bar an attack regardless of
the effect that it would have on an enemy force.89 Even if the proposed
attack would cause significant casualties to an enemy force, it would
not be barred by a proportionality test so long as the effects on civilians
are outweighed.9 0
Further, the harms to be considered in a proportionality review
are only those that would cause damage to civilian objects or physical
harm to civilian personnel.91 Not to be included in the equation are
irritation, strife, fear, or inconvenience, all of which may conceivably
be brought on by a cyber attack.92 Unless these lesser consequences
amount to "damage to civilian objects" they should not have bearing on
a proportionality test.9 3 There is some gray area, however, where it
comes to the reduced functionality of a civilian computer system and
whether that effect should be considered in a proportionality review.94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Applicability of Proportionality and the Law of Armed Conflict
to Cyber Warfare
While it seems to be settled law that an "attack" (in the military
sense) would be governed by the law of armed conflict, and thus subject
to a proportionality standard, there has been relatively vigorous debate
87. See generally id. (arguing that counterinsurgency changes the
proportionality calculus).
88. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-on Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1145,
1171 (2003) ("It is not an attempt to ensure a 'fair fight' between combatants.").
89. See id. ("In other words, there is no requirement that a combatant limit his
force when engaging another combatant.").
90. Id.
91. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 160 ("The rule envisages a situation
where a cyber attack on a military objective will result in harm to civilian objects . .. or
to civilians.").
92. See id. ("Such consequences do not qualify as collateral damage.").
93. Id.
94. See id. ("[T]he notion of 'damage to civilian objects' might, in certain
circumstances, include deprivation of functionality.").
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in recent years as to whether or not all hostilities in the realm of cyber
warfare, in fact, constitute "attacks."9 5 At least one commenter has
argued that the term "attack" should be reserved for an action that
results in death, damage, destruction, or injury, and therefore, many
cyber crimes would not be considered "attacks."96 If this is in fact the
case, no proportionality standard would need to be applied to a cyber
attack because, by its own terms, the rule of proportionality is
applicable only to "attack[s]."9 7 On the other hand, another commenter
would apply a broader definition, arguing that any action aimed at
civilians amounts to an "attack." 9 In this case, a proportionality
analysis would almost certainly be required. 99
The Tallinn Manual clearly states that the principle of
proportionality applies in its full capacity to acts of cyber warfare: "A
cyber attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage is prohibited."1 00 This seems to be the prevailing
view among the community, and even those who would argue for a
narrower definition of a cyber attack would likely concede that in some
contexts a proportionality analysis would be required. 101 However,
because there has been relatively little application of these concepts to
actual events, they remain largely hypothetical and these arguments
may not become settled until states engage in further cyber activities
and flesh out these theoretical positions.
B. Difficulties in the Application of Proportionality to Cyber Attacks
The difficulties in applying the law of armed conflict to cyber
warfare are potent and numerous. They are brought on by several
factors, including the prevalence of "dual use" systems (i.e., those that
are used by both military and civilian actors) and the difficulties that
may arise in discerning what is civilian from what is military.
Additionally, the mere presence of dual-use systems may lead to
increased levels of civilian damage. Further, the existence of "knock-
95. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in
Attack, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 198, 200-01 (2013) (discussing differing viewpoints).
96. See id. (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack
and Jus in Bello, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 365, 369 (2002)).
97. Protocol 1, supra, note 31.
98. See Jensen, supra note 95 (citing Knut Ddrmann, The Legal Situation of
"Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 46, 72-73 (2003);
KNUT DORMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACKS (2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
applicabilityofihltocna.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WPE-MHJZ] (archived Dec. 19, 2016).
99. Id.
100. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 159.
101. See e.g., Jensen supra note 88, at 1174 (discussing the application of
proportionality to computer network attacks).
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on effects" (those indirect effects that may result from a given action,
but are not immediately discernable) and the fact that military
commanders must account for them in a proportionality analysis
present difficulties.
1. Dual-Use Systems
Dual-use systems are those systems that serve both a military and
a civilian purpose. They are especially prevalent in the realm of cyber
technology. 102 While militaries often use easily distinguishable
facilities when it comes to conventional resources, cyber networks are
commonly much more intertwined between civilian and military
uses.1 03 Although these dual-use systems can certainly be legitimate
military targets, they present a number of unique challenges to a
commander conducting a proportionality review. 104
Examples include power plants that supply electricity to both
civilian and military users, air traffic control systems that service both
civilian and military aircrafts, and communication networks on which
both civilian and military users operate.05 Such systems are relatively
common outside of the realm of cyberspace, and even more common
within it.106 The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a system that was
created to serve military purposes, and originally served only military
users, although recently it has been developed and integrated into
civilian devices to the point that the technology has become nearly
ubiquitous.0 7
It is important to recognize that a dual-use system can certainly
be a viable military target. 108 While the civilian capability may
influence and alter the proportionality analysis, that is not to say that
a civilian use precludes a target's susceptibility to lawful attack.'0 9 It
has been generally recognized that two requirements must be met
before a dual use system niay be a legitimate military target: first, the
target must make an effective contribution to the enemy's military
102. HEATHER HARRISON DINNIss, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 193
(2012).
103. See id. at 194 ("Some systems initially designed for military use have become
so integrated into civilian society that any interference or disruption caused by computer
network attacks would have serious effects on civilians.").
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 194.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 193 ("[F]rom the standpoint of international humanitarian law,
once an object meets the definition of a military objective it becomes liable to attack.").
109. See id. at 193-94 ("The discussion of any civilian aspect or purpose of that
object or piece of technology should therefore be considered as part of the proportionality
equation. .. .").
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action, and second, the target's destruction must provide a definite
military advantage to the attacker.110 Further, an attack against a
dual-use system must pass a proportionality test."' However, once
those prerequisites have been met, a dual-use system may be the
lawful target of an attack, unlike a system that is purely civilian in
nature.
One often-recounted example of the lawful targeting of a dual-use
system took place during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 112 U.S.
intelligence discovered that Saddam Hussein's forces employed
infrastructure that provided electricity to both the command and
control nodes of the hostile Iraqi forces and to the civilian
population. 113 This infrastructure constituted a dual-use system
because it served both a military and a civilian purpose, providing
service to both military and civilian users. 114 U.S. forces chose to
destroy the target, which was a lawful action.1 15 Because the military
advantage to be gained by destroying the infrastructure outweighed
the harm to be caused to the civilian populace, the targeting of the
infrastructure passed a proportionality review and was permissible
within the law of armed conflict.11 6
While dual use systems may be legitimate military targets, two
distinct problems arise in the contemplation of proportionality and
cyber attacks: the likelihood that impacts on civilian infrastructure
will be increased and the difficulty presented in discerning what parts
of dual-use systems are civilian from what parts are military.
a. Increased Impact on Civilian Infrastructure
Because of the prevalence of dual-use systems in the realm of
cyber technology, and due to the overlap between civilian and military
networks, cyber attacks are likely to have an increased impact on
civilian infrastructure. An increased impact on civilian infrastructure
may make a proportionality test more difficult to pass, since the
potential damage to civilians could be greater. Although a
proportionality analysis may be more difficult to conduct, that does not
mean that a target is illegitimate. However, if the impact on civilian
infrastructure is increased to the point that it outweighs the military
110. See Schaap, supra note 45, at 156-57 (2009) ("First, the target must make
an effective contribution to the enemy's military action. Second, its destruction must
provide a definite military advantage to the attacker.").
111. See id. ("However, just as with a non dual-use object, a proportionality test
must be performed to ensure the collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects is not
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.").
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advantage to be gained, this would constitute an attack violative of the
law of armed conflict.
One commenter suggests that those who would target civilian
infrastructure may find dual-use targets more attractive because
attackers may benefit doubly from the resulting damage.1 17 Attackers
would incur benefits from both the damage done to military objectives,
and also from damage done to the civilian population. 118 If the
resulting damage against a civilian population is intentional, however,
the attack probably violates the principle of distinction, whereby an
attacker must distinguish, and not target, civilian entities.1 19 Article
52(2) of Additional Protocol I states in part that, "[a]ttacks shall be
limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action .... "120 Therefore, military commanders who do not want to
violate this convention must go to great lengths to ensure that the
pending attack does not violate the rule of proportionality.
b. Difficulties in Discerning Civilian from Military
Additionally, difficulties are likely to arise in discerning civilian
from military infrastructure because of the prevalence of dual-use
systems. This leads to a two-part problem. First, military commanders
may be unable to discern the difference in the infrastructure itself.
Second, they may be unable to tell what impact their attacks will have
on the civilian infrastructure so as to make a complete proportionality
calculation.
Discerning military from civilian infrastructure is critical to a
thorough proportionality review for obvious reasons: a military
commander about to engage in an attack must know the identity and
capabilities of the system he is considering attacking if he is to
reasonably predict the effects of his attack. This analysis is
increasingly difficult in an environment where civilian and military
personnel commonly use computer systems simultaneously.121
117. See DINNISS, supra, note 102, at 195 (hypothesizing an attacker who may be
thusly motivated).
118. See id. ("The attacker not only benefits from the destruction ... of the
target's military value, but also from cumulative effects on the civilian population.").
119. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 110-11 (defining distinction thusly:
'the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to
weaken the military forces of the enemy").
120. Protocol I, supra note 31.
121. See DINNISS, supra, note 102 at 194 ("Most computer technology, hardware
and software, has become dual-use.").
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One example might be a satellite system that is being used for
GPS guidance.12 2 If it is known that a satellite system is being used for
both civilian and military purposes, a military commander may be
unable to discern to what degree it is being used for each. Given the
hazy and fast-paced nature of military operations, a commander may
only have intelligence to inform him that the satellite is providing
guidance to a military system, and may not know what other functions
it performs. This would make it difficult to conduct a proportionality
analysis. If the commander does not know what civilian use the system
has, it would be difficult or impossible to estimate the effects of an
attack.123 In contrast with conventional systems, which a commander
may easily understand at first glance, cyber systems are often grasped
less easily.
This brings about an additional problem, one that has largely been
hypothetical in the context of cyber warfare thus far, but may present
a real dilemma in the future. 124 When the International Group of
Experts gathered in Estonia to construct the Tallinn Manual, they
disagreed as to what an attacker must do if he suspects, but is unsure,
that civilian damage might occur. 125 As may be evident, this has
particular relevance in the realm of cyber warfare, where predicting
damage can be particularly difficult.126 A minority of those experts
believed that a lower probability of damage would allow an attacker to
go forward with an attack that would result in less military
advantage. 127 The majority disagreed, saying that "once collateral
damage is expected, it must be calculated into the proportionality
analysis as such; it is not appropriate to consider the degree of
certainty as to possible collateral damage."12 8
2. Knock-on Effects
Knock-on effects, also called second- and third-order effects, are
the indirect consequences that flow from the direct results of a given
122. See id. at 194 ("[T]he Global Positioning System (GPS) is a US military
system which has become integrated into many civilian applications from aircraft traffic
control to cell phones and laptops and even the internet itself.").
123. See id. ("Disruption of the service through jamming or blocking or spoofing
the signal via computer network attack would cause massive disruption and potentially
endanger civilian lives.").
124. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 163 ("There was a discussion among
the International Group of Experts over whether and to what extent uncertainty as to
collateral damage affects application of the rule.").
125. Id.
126. See id. ("The issue is of particular relevance in the context of cyber attacks
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action.129 Second- and third-order consequences are especially difficult
to discern in a cyber context. Much has been made of knock-on effects
in the area of proportionality review, but it seems to be settled law that
when commanders conduct a proportionality analysis they must
account not only for the direct effects to be caused by the attack, but
also for these follow-on effects.13 0
For example, a military commander who considers targeting a rail
depot will certainly consider the primary effects of his proposed attack,
perhaps that the rail depot will no longer be able to transport military
goods to the local militia. 131 But if the rail depot also services the
surrounding civilian community, targeting the rail depot may have
knock-on effects as well.132 Trains will no longer be able to transport
goods required to keep the local economy afloat, and they will no longer
be able to transport civilian personnel to the surrounding area. 133 This
may affect the loyalties of the local populace, turning the tide of public
opinion in the area against he commander, and may make the
commander's mission more difficult to accomplish than if he had never
targeted the rail depot in the first place. These unintended
consequences are known as knock-on effects. Although they may be
difficult to assess, a commander must attempt to quantify these effects
in a proportionality analysis before conducting an attack. 134 In the
context of cyber operations, however, this may be increasingly difficult
for several reasons.
First, the interconnectedness of modern cyber systems leads to an
increased difficulty in estimating the effects of an attack. Today more
than ever, computer systems are linked to each other directly and
indirectly across vast systems of networking. 135 Because computer
systems are so interconnected, information can, and does, travel
between networks at distances that make it difficult to predict the
ripple effects of an action with any precision. 136 This problem is
129. See Jensen, supra note 88, at 1176.
130. See generally id. (discussing the legal standard for review of computer
network attacks as opposed to kinetic attacks).
131. See id. at 1157 (describing the rail depot example).
132. See id. at 1177-78 (describing possible knock on effects of the rail depot
attack).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1172 ("[The commander] must determine if the expected incidental
injury or damage to civilian objects is excessive to the military advantage of destroying
that rail hub and military equipment.").
135. See MARK GRAHAM & STEFANO DE SABATA, INTERNET TUBE: AN ABSTRACTION
OF THE GLOBAL SUBMARINE FIBRE-OPTIC NETWORK (2014),
http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/?page=internet-tube [https://perma.cc/28KA-9U8Y]
(archived Dec. 18, 2016) ("Today, an entire network of fibre-optic cables connects almost
every corner of the world, enabling the hyper-connected world that many of us take for
granted.").
136. Id.
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furthered by the international application of networking and the fact
that computer systems often traverse one or more nations with one or
more languages. 137 The multi-national, multi-linguistic aspects of
modern computing make understanding the reach of a given system
increasingly difficult. Today's computing systems' employment of
broad networks, across vast areas of time and space, makes it difficult
to estimate the ways in which a cyber attack may affect those outside
the initial sphere of influence.'3 8
Second, the speed at which computer systems operate presents an
equally worrisome obstacle to the adequate estimation of second- and
third-order effects. Computers today operate at speeds that might have
been inconceivable only a short time ago.i39 Where central processing
units once occupied only two-thousand transistors, they have increased
in recent years to house nearly two billion. 140 Undoubtedly, this
increased ability to process information at great speeds has led to huge
advancements in the availability and applications of electronic devices
in modern life.141 The fact that computers operate faster now than ever
before has also made the predictability of a potential cyber attack's
influence more unknowable. Information travels faster and further
than it ever has, and ripple effects can be very difficult to predict.
The inability to predict end outcomes was evident in the Stuxnet
case.142 The Stuxnet malware virus was reportedly released by a joint
U.S.-Israeli operation in an attempt to infect and destroy Iranian
nuclear centrifuges.143 After gaining access to the Iranian networks,
the malware performed two functions.144 It forced the centrifuges to
speed up and slow down at such a rate as to cause them to destroy
themselves, and the virus caused the computer systems to send signals
to operators that the centrifuges were operating normally.145 While the
137. See Daniel Sorid, Writing the Web's Future in Numerous Languages, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/31/technology/internet/
31hindi.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=O [https://perma.cc/7WHU-95ZW] (archived
Dec. 19, 2016) ("The next chapter of the World Wide Web will not be written in English
alone . . .Already, more than half of the search queries on Google come from outside the
United States.").
138. Id.
139. See Dean Takahashi, Forty Years of Moore's Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 18,
2005), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/forty-years-of-moores-law/ [https://
perma.cc/F6GB-LMBL] (archived Dec. 16, 2018) ("The result is a world unimaginable
four decades ago: Computers once the size of refrigerators fit in the palm of your hand.").
140. Id.
141. See id. ("It is why technology has infiltrated the lives of everyday people,
from iPods and Xboxes to camera pills that wirelessly transmit photos of patients'
digestive tracts.").
142. See generally Jensen, supra note 95 (discussing the implications and
potential illegality of the Stuxnet attacks).
143. Id. at 203.
144. Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need
for Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 842, 844 (2012).
145. Id.
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virus was successful in its presumed goal (causing damage and
destruction to the centrifuges), the virus allegedly was leaked to
computers outside the intended network. 146 Although no other damage
outside of the centrifuges was reported, the leak led to public
knowledge of the previously secret virus.147
The Stuxnet case is illustrative of the difficulties practitioners
may encounter in estimating knock-on effects posed by the
interconnectedness of cyber systems, even those posed to well-funded,
high-level operations. If a highly-sophisticated attack, purportedly
perpetrated secretly by the governments of two of the most
technologically advanced nations in the world, can fall prey to an
inability to foresee knock-on effects, then it is evident that the obstacle
is a real one that could affect any potential cyber operation.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR MILITARY PRACTITIONERS
Cyber operations may provide military commanders a preferable
alternative to conventional attacks for several reasons.148 First, and
most importantly, they may provide the same military advantage
without posing a risk to the lives of friendly forces, enemy forces, or
civilians. 149 Second, they may be able to accomplish the same goals as
a conventional strike at a far smaller monetary cost.1 50 Without the
expenditure of ammunition, fossil fuels, or man-hours normally
associated with a conventional attack, a cyber attack can reduce the
expenditures of money and resources. There is also a possibility that
cyber attacks can achieve military goals with lessened physical
destruction and socio-political implications, but these benefits are less
certain.151
While some military commanders view cyber operations as a less
dangerous and more cost-effective tool, the operations must still be
carried out within the structure of the international law of armed
conflict. 152 Following are several recommendations to commanders
who wish to utilize these potentially beneficial tools within that legal
framework.
146. Jensen, supra note 95, at 207-08.
147. Id.
148. See Schaap, supra note 45, at 158 ("Some obvious benefits include less
physical destruction, less cost than other types of traditional warfare, and the ability to
still achieve the same results with less risk to military personnel.").
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. ("This example demonstrates the non-physical destruction aspect of
cyber warfare operations, which in many cases will reduce the expected collateral
damage to civilians and civilian property.").
152. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 13 ("[T]he Experts unanimously
concluded that general principles of international law applied to cyberspace.").
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A. Conduct a Thorough Analysis Before the Attack
For those versed in the law of armed conflict, it may be commonly
understood that commanders must conduct a proportionality review
before commencing an attack. However, in the realm of cyber
operations, this may be easier said than done.
Leading up to a cyber attack, it may be appealing to a commander
to forgo a thorough proportionality review in favor of a more cursory,
expedited undertaking. After all, in the context of cyber operations, a
military commander may view a cyber attack as less likely to result in
damage to civilians or civilian objects than a conventional, kinetic
attack. 153 If the commander views these negative results as less
probable, he may view the accompanying proportionality review as less
essential than it would be if he were to carry out a kinetic attack. This
is likely a mistake. Given the unpredictable nature of cyber operations,
even the most well-planned cyber attack may have far-reaching
consequences. In the Stuxnet case, for example, the virus was
inadvertently released onto public computers after it had affected
targeted Iranian centrifuges. 154 Although this result was likely
unforeseen by the attackers, a thorough review may have prevented
the outcome. Because of this kind of unpredictability, it is essential to
conduct a thorough proportionality review prior to a cyber attack.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I is titled "Precautions in the
Attack" and states that "[i]n the conduct of military operations,
constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects."155 In this context, the term "military operations"
is even broader than the term "attack," and poses a requirement on
militaries to exert caution as to civilians and civilian objects, even
when not in the throes of battle. 156 This, known as the "constant care
standard," shows the high level of care that military commanders must
be held to at all times during military operations.15 7
In the cyber warfare context, the constant care standard likely
requires commanders to maintain situational awareness at all times
and to remain vigilant as to the effects of their actions, especially as
they may potentially affect civilians. 158 This may be difficult in a cyber
context, however, where any action taken on a computer network can
153. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
155. Protocol I, supra note 31.
156. See Jensen, supra note 95, at 202 ("The term'military operations' is obviously
meant to be much broader than the term 'attack' and imposes a general legal
requirement on militaries even when not attacking.").
157. See id. ("[I]t seems clear that exercising constant care would at least mean
that a commander cannot ignore effects on civilian population.").
158. See id. ("When employing a cyber tool or conducting cyber operations, the
commander would need to maintain oversight of the tool and be ready to adjust
operations if the tool or operation began to have effects that the commander determined
would have an illegal impact on civilians.").
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affect civilians and "virtually every cyber operation will traverse,
affect, employ or damage civilian cyber infrastructure of some kind." 5 9
If this high level of vigilance is required of commanders when they are
not conducting attacks per se, and merely conducting cyber operations
that fall short of attacks, the level of caution should be appropriately
increased when a commander orders a cyber attack. 160 A
proportionality review should be near the top of a commander's list of
actions and a crucial step in the process under these circumstances.
Regardless of the difficulties that may be presented by the
complexity of today's networks, the unpredictability of an attack on
civilian infrastructure or the potential of dual-use systems, military
commanders are required to perform a proportionality analysis before
engaging in an attack. As discussed, if a commander's planned action
amounts to an attack, it unquestionably should be subject to a
proportionality review, but this may be difficult for several reasons.
Modern computer networks operate across vast distances and speeds
nearly incomprehensible to the human mind. Nonetheless,
commanders must take the necessary pains to assess the likely
outcomes of the actions they take.
B. Retain a Specialist
A question remains as to whether military commanders are
positively required to retain a network specialist to assist in
proportionality reviews related to cyber operations.16' Especially in the
midst of an ongoing kinetic conflict, it may be difficult to have a
computer specialist on hand in the field who is capable of providing
reliable advice to a military commander concerning the potential
effects of a proposed cyber attack.162
Ordinarily, military commanders are under obligations to both
obtain the best possible intelligence and to act in good faith once that
intelligence has been gathered.163 In the context of traditional, kinetic
attacks, mainstream military officers can often achieve these
objectives.164 Military staff officers are often trained and proficient in
159. Id. at 203.
160. Id. at 202-03.
161. See DINNISS, supra note 102, at 206 ("Michael Schmitt has also queried the
extent to which specialized computer expertise must be available during the targeting
process to assess possible collateral damage and incidental injury.").
162. Id.
163. See id. at 207 ("[Commanders] are also under an obligation to obtain the best
possible intelligence . . . .").
164. See id. at 206 ("[I]n traditional kinetic attacks, properly trained mainstream
military officers can usually conduct reliable collateral damage estimates based on their
knowledge of the weapons system involved and its effects .... ).
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the use of traditional weapon systems such that they should be able to
provide a commanding officer with collateral damage estimates in
support of a proportionality analysis, when an attack is the traditional,
kinetic type.165 However, if a commander wishes to employ a cyber
attack, the training and ability to conduct such an estimate may lie
beyond the abilities of a traditional staff officer.' 6 6
Commanders have several options in deciding how to handle the
role of the computer specialist at the staff officer level. One possibility
would be for the commander to look outside of the uniformed forces to
find a capable specialist. Another would be that the military trains
uniformed officers to accomplish these tasks. Lastly, a commander may
wish to go it alone, and do the best he or she can without the aid of a
computer specialist.
Only the last of those options seems untenable. Because military
leaders are responsible for obtaining intelligence before taking action,
they probably have a responsibility to employ a specialist to aid a
proportionality review, whether that specialist is drawn from civilian
or military personnel. It seems likely that a military capable of
conducting a cyber attack with significant impacts on civilian
infrastructure would have the resources at its disposal to train and
equip a specialist capable of assisting in a proportionality review,
whether that individual is a uniformed officer or not. However, this
may be expensive.
Employing a specialist, a person that is monetarily expensive to
train and sustain, is a costly proposition. One of the major advantages
that the use of cyber attacks provides to commanders, as an alternative
to kinetic attacks, is their ability to effect the same outcomes as a
kinetic attack without expending the same level of resources. 167 If
employing a specialist is required before a commander may conduct a
proportionality test, this cost may offset the monetary advantage of a
cyber attack.
Further, even if a commander never decides that a cyber attack is
necessary or desirable, the commander must still retain the specialist.
This may lead to the expenditure of resources on the training and
equipping of personnel who might never become useful. Although, if
the other advantages of a cyber attack are also weighed into the
equation (the absence of lost lives and the lack of destruction of
property), the monetary expense of employing a specialist seems less
consequential. If this is the case, and employing a specialist assists the
commander in achieving those two goals, then the inconvenience and
monetary costs of doing so is likely outweighed.
165. Id.
166. See id. ("[I1n computer network attacks highly specialised expertise would be
required.").
167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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C. Conduct the Attack in a Way That Is Not an 'Attack"
If the law of armed conflict does not apply where actions do not
constitute an "attack," then commanders may be able to take actions
that are not subject to proportionality review. 168 At least one
commenter has taken a strong stance that this is in fact the case,
arguing that "very few activities in cyber warfare will actually amount
to an attack and will therefore not be governed by the principles of
attack, such as proportionality."169 Further, military commanders take
actions on a regular basis that do not amount to attacks. Intelligence
gathering operations and reconnaissance operations represent actions
which can affect the battlefield, but do not constitute attacks against
an enemy force. Cyber actions of this type are probably not attacks and
are probably not subject to proportionality reviews. If commanders can
achieve the goals as dictated by the situation through actions that are
not attacks, then they may circumvent the requirement to conduct a
proportionality review.
However, this advice may best be left until a fuller definition of
cyber attack is fleshed out. As has been discussed, the current
definition of cyber attack leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity,
and what one legal practitioner may consider an "attack," another may
not.1 70 Because military commanders will be judged with the benefit
and burden of hindsight, relying on a definition that has been accepted
by only part of the legal community may be unwise. This is especially
true because a commander's actions may have broad consequences if
he takes what is later considered to be a military attack without having
engaged in a proportionality review, possibly leading to his own
prosecution.
Another possibility is to attack a military system through a
civilian system.171 The Stuxnet virus utilized this technique.172 In that
instance, the virus was first released into five gateway targets before
it penetrated Iranian centrifuges.'7 3 Arguably, like a tank passing
through a village before targeting a military objective, no
proportionality review need take place as to the civilian portal, as no
168. See Jensen, supra note 95, at 199.
169. Id.
170. See supra Section II.A.
171. See DINNISS, supra note 102, at 201 ("This raises particular issues with
attacks in which civilian networks or systems are targeted and used as gateways to get
inside networks which are legitimate military objectives.")
172. Id. at n.95.
173. Id.
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attack has yet taken place.174 This of course requires that the software
not release its payload until it reaches the legitimate military target.175
Some commenters would argue, however, that this technique
constitutes targeting the civilian portal, and thus this technique should
be considered illegitimate.'76
Finally, a commander often has the option to limit his attack to
only affect the military portions of a system or network. 177 If, for
instance, a commander has difficulty in mapping a computer system
and cannot determine what portion of the system is civilian and what
portion is military, or if he has had difficulty predicting the knock-on
effects that will result from the attack he is considering, then the
commander may wish to limit his attack to some smaller, more
knowable portion of the system. In this way, the commander may
prevent second- and third-order effects from reaching civilian
infrastructure, and prevent an indiscriminate, illegitimate attack.
V. CONCLUSION: A SOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
As many have noted, the law of cyber warfare is behind the reality
of the times, and in order to catch up, an international agreement may
be necessary.1 78 As compared to other facets of international law, there
is little agreement among states on the subject of cyber security, and
even less as the law pertains to cyber attacks and cyber warfare.179
Because many of the questions regarding the law of cyber war are
answered only by analogy to existing laws, problems arise when
analogies are stretched too thinly. 1so The ideal solution would be
international agreement on the subject, and some forays have been
made.1 8'
NATO has recently developed the Cyber Defense Management
Board and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence
174. See id. at 201 ("A civilian network may be infected with malware, however it
may not execute its payload until it reaches a network with the targeted network
configuration.").
175. See id. ("The civilian system is essentially unharmed ... but it passes on the
malware to the targeted system where the payload executes.").
176. See id. ("A query remains whether this is sufficient to hold that the state is
directing its military operations against the civilian target, contrary to Article 48; or
whether the operation is directed against its final, legitimate military objective . . . .").
177. See Jensen, supra note 95, at 210 ("[H]e should limit the attack to only those
parts of the system for which he does have sufficient information to verify their status
as lawful targets.").
178. See Chayes, supra note 18, at 500 ("[C]reative attempts have been made to
bring cyber attacks under the umbrella of existing international and domestic legal
doctrines.").
179. See id. at 510 ("Efforts to institutionalize international cooperation are
rudimentary.").
180. See id. at 500 ("[A]nalogies, however creative and persuasive, are not
infinitely elastic.").
181. See id. at 510-19 (summarizing attempts at cooperation).
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in Tallinn.182 The Cyber Defense Center headed the establishment of
the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare, the preeminent reatise on the subject.'8 3 These foundations
have helped NATO establish an institutional structure to deal with
cyber attacks, and have led to international cooperation in the area.184
The European Union has adopted a Union-wide directive to
improve cooperation on cyber security. 185 While EU nations have
previously employed security measures on a largely voluntary basis,
the new directive requires nations to meet a minimum threshold of
cyber defenses and encourages them to cooperate and communicate
with other nations in the European Union on the matter.86 Canada
has launched Canada's Cyber Security Strategy, the United Kingdom
has developed The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and
Promoting the UK in a Digitized World, and Russia has recently
published its Conceptual Views Regarding the Activities of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space.18 7 These efforts
and others are necessary to ensure that cyber attacks are limited to
those instances where the proponents have conformed to the law of
armed conflict.
While the advent of computer systems and cyber attacks has
brought some confusion to the landscape of the law of armed conflict,
these likely are growing pains that can and should be worked through
over time. As has been shown, there is a lack of clarity not only in the
definition of the term "cyber attack," but in the applicability of the law
of armed conflict to actions that might fall under that banner. Further,
even if it is granted that the proportionality rule should be applied to
a given cyber operation, doing so may be exponentially more difficult
than it would be to apply the rule in a traditional kinetic context, either
because of knock-on effects, dual-use systems, or any of the other
unique attributes of computer networks. Several solutions present
themselves to commanders. They may wish to conduct a thorough
analysis before the attack, to retain a specialist, or to alter the nature
of their operation.
None of this is to suggest hat the law of armed conflict, writ large,
is incompatible with cyber operations, or to argue that the
182. Id. at 511.
183. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 1 ("In 2009 the NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defense Center of Excellence ... invited an independent 'International Group of
Experts' to produce a manual on the law governing cyber warfare.").
184. See Chayes, supra note 18, at 511 ("There are conferences and membership
training to defend against cyber attack, which has included NATO training the
Jordanian army to defend against ISIS cyber attacks.").
185. Id. at 511-12.
186. Id.
187. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 24, at 2.
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fundamentals of the law require redrafting to meet the needs of a
newly interconnected world. In fact, just the opposite is likely true. The
law of armed conflict's principles operate as a backstop and a failsafe
in times of drastic uncertainty. The principles that undergird this body
of law, while difficult in application to a new and changing area of
technology, function to let those who participate in the conduct of
armed conflict know that the way that they do so is in a manner that
is legitimate and justified, and within the bounds of the law.
On the other hand, the Estonia attack provides a striking example
of what chaos can be sewn when world players go unchecked and use
powerful cyber warfare techniques against vulnerable civilian
populations. The law of armed conflict, and the continued adherence to
it in the context of cyber operations provides a way to prevent such
abuses, if these laws can be clearly applied.
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